



## Cambridge International AS & A Level

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HISTORY

9389/41

Paper 4 Depth Study 41

May/June 2020

MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 60

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**Published**

Students did not sit exam papers in the June 2020 series due to the Covid-19 global pandemic.

This mark scheme is published to support teachers and students and should be read together with the question paper. It shows the requirements of the exam. The answer column of the mark scheme shows the proposed basis on which Examiners would award marks for this exam. Where appropriate, this column also provides the most likely acceptable alternative responses expected from students. Examiners usually review the mark scheme after they have seen student responses and update the mark scheme if appropriate. In the June series, Examiners were unable to consider the acceptability of alternative responses, as there were no student responses to consider.

Mark schemes should usually be read together with the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers. However, because students did not sit exam papers, there is no Principal Examiner Report for Teachers for the June 2020 series.

Cambridge International will not enter into discussions about these mark schemes.

Cambridge International is publishing the mark schemes for the June 2020 series for most Cambridge IGCSE™ and Cambridge International A & AS Level components, and some Cambridge O Level components.

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This document consists of **21** printed pages.

**Generic Marking Principles**

These general marking principles must be applied by all examiners when marking candidate answers. They should be applied alongside the specific content of the mark scheme or generic level descriptors for a question. Each question paper and mark scheme will also comply with these marking principles.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 1:**

Marks must be awarded in line with:

- the specific content of the mark scheme or the generic level descriptors for the question
- the specific skills defined in the mark scheme or in the generic level descriptors for the question
- the standard of response required by a candidate as exemplified by the standardisation scripts.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 2:**

Marks awarded are always **whole marks** (not half marks, or other fractions).

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 3:**

Marks must be awarded **positively**:

- marks are awarded for correct/valid answers, as defined in the mark scheme. However, credit is given for valid answers which go beyond the scope of the syllabus and mark scheme, referring to your Team Leader as appropriate
- marks are awarded when candidates clearly demonstrate what they know and can do
- marks are not deducted for errors
- marks are not deducted for omissions
- answers should only be judged on the quality of spelling, punctuation and grammar when these features are specifically assessed by the question as indicated by the mark scheme. The meaning, however, should be unambiguous.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 4:**

Rules must be applied consistently e.g. in situations where candidates have not followed instructions or in the application of generic level descriptors.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 5:**

Marks should be awarded using the full range of marks defined in the mark scheme for the question (however; the use of the full mark range may be limited according to the quality of the candidate responses seen).

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 6:**

Marks awarded are based solely on the requirements as defined in the mark scheme. Marks should not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.

Question 1–12	Generic Levels of Response:	Marks
<b>Level 5:</b>	<p>Responses show a very good understanding of the question and contain a relevant, focused and balanced argument, fully supported by appropriate factual material and based on a consistently analytical approach.</p> <p>Towards the top of the level, responses may be expected to be analytical, focused and balanced throughout. The candidate will be in full control of the argument and will reach a supported judgement in response to the question.</p> <p>Towards the lower end of the level, responses might typically be analytical, consistent and balanced but the argument might not be fully convincing.</p>	<b>25–30</b>
<b>Level 4:</b>	<p>Responses show a good understanding of the question and contain a relevant argument based on a largely analytical approach.</p> <p>Towards the top of the level, responses are likely to be analytical, balanced and effectively supported. There may be some attempt to reach a judgement but this may be partial or unsupported.</p> <p>Towards the lower end of the level, responses are likely to contain detailed and accurate factual material with some focused analysis but the argument is inconsistent or unbalanced.</p>	<b>19–24</b>
<b>Level 3:</b>	<p>Responses show understanding of the question and contain appropriate factual material. The material may lack depth. Some analytical points may be made but these may not be highly developed or consistently supported.</p> <p>Towards the top of the level, responses contain detailed and accurate factual material. However, attempts to argue relevantly are implicit or confined to introductions or conclusions. Alternatively, responses may offer an analytical approach which contains some supporting material.</p> <p>Towards the lower end of the level, responses might offer narrative or description relating to the topic but are less likely to address the terms of the question.</p>	<b>13–18</b>
<b>Level 2:</b>	<p>Responses show some understanding of the demands of the question. They may be descriptive with few links to the question or may be analytical with limited factual relevant factual support.</p> <p>Towards the top of the level, responses might contain relevant commentaries which lack adequate factual support. The responses may contain some unsupported assertions.</p> <p>Towards the lower end of the level, responses are likely to contain some information which is relevant to the topic but may only offer partial coverage.</p>	<b>7–12</b>

<b>Question 1–12</b>	<b>Generic Levels of Response:</b>	<b>Marks</b>
<b>Level 1:</b>	<p>Responses show limited understanding of the question. They may contain some description which is linked to the topic or only address part of the question.</p> <p>Towards the top of the level, responses show some awareness of relevant material but this may be presented as a list.</p> <p>Towards the lower end of the level, answers may provide a little relevant material but are likely to be characterised by irrelevance.</p>	<b>1–6</b>
<b>Level 0:</b>	<b>No relevant creditworthy content.</b>	<b>0</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
1	<p><b>'Its use of brutal repression was the main reason why the Bolshevik regime was still in power by 1924.' How far do you agree?</b></p> <p>Candidates will have to assess the relative importance of repression for the Bolshevik's survival compared with other factors. Stronger responses may identify how 'brutal' Bolshevik repression was compared with earlier Tsarist regimes as a way of assessing its importance.</p> <p>Evidence that agrees brutal repression was the main reason for Bolshevik retention of power could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The use of force in the actual take-over of power in October 1917. The Bolsheviks were prepared to kill all opposition.</li> <li>• The clearing of the Constituent Assembly by force by the Red Guards in 1918 and ending of any sign of democratic legitimacy.</li> <li>• The creation and use of the Cheka, the idea of 'over killing' being better than being overthrown. Estimates of the killings range from 15,000 to 300,000, and they included not only Tsarists but also many liberals and left wingers such as the Social Revolutionaries.</li> <li>• The creation of the Gulags.</li> <li>• The creation of War Communism with its compulsory seizure of grain and the methods used to carry it out.</li> <li>• The ban on factions and the censorship imposed.</li> <li>• The methods used to win the Civil War, the mass execution of prisoners.</li> <li>• The killing of the Tsar and his family.</li> <li>• The eradication of dissent, e.g. Kronstadt revolt of 1921.</li> </ul> <p>Evidence of other reasons for Bolshevik retention of power could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The leadership and decision-taking ability of Lenin.</li> <li>• Ending the war at Brest–Litovsk.</li> <li>• Permitting the take-over of land by the peasantry which also helped to appease a demoralised and mutinous army.</li> <li>• The way in which the nationalities were managed/appeased.</li> <li>• Successfully winning the Civil War and because of the incompetence and divisions within their opponents.</li> <li>• The Bolsheviks (Reds) controlled the cities while the Whites and Greens were spread throughout the countryside.</li> <li>• The failure of the other Left-Wing parties to work with the liberals to counteract the Bolsheviks.</li> <li>• Highly effective propaganda by the Bolsheviks.</li> <li>• The compromise of the NEP which assisted in a degree of economic recovery.</li> <li>• Memories of the failings of the Tsarist regime and the Provisional Government.</li> <li>• The appeal of Marxism to many.</li> </ul>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
2	<p><b>Assess the reasons why the democratic parties were unpopular in Italy by 1922.</b></p> <p>The identification of a variety of factors is looked for, with assessment on each of them and there should also be prioritisation to indicate which factors were of greater importance.</p> <p>The principal factors leading to their unpopularity could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Democratic parties were already unpopular before the war, gaining a reputation not only for corruption, but also incompetence and in-fighting.</li> <li>• Italy had only recently become a united country and major socioeconomic and political issues had never really been tackled.</li> <li>• Pre-war imperial attempts had largely been a failure, in East Africa, the Balkans and North Africa. Italy felt humiliated and ignored.</li> <li>• The cynicism behind firstly the membership of the Triple Alliance, and secondly the switch to supporting the other side, was obvious.</li> <li>• The humiliation of defeat by the Austrians initially and the need for rescue by the British and French.</li> <li>• The lack of the many hoped-for gains at Versailles and the obvious humiliation of Orlando.</li> <li>• The way in which D’Annunzio was able to seize Fiume and the failure to deal with him highlighted their failings.</li> <li>• The high level of unemployment, economic dislocation and unemployment after the war.</li> <li>• The growing hostility towards it felt by the elites, and above all the Roman Catholic Church, which actively used the pulpit and its press to undermine the liberal/democratic processes.</li> <li>• Rapid turnover of governments which appeared both weak and indecisive and incapable of dealing with the major problems facing Italy.</li> <li>• The growth of popular disorder such as strikes during the ‘Biennio Rosso’ and the work of the ‘ras’ which further emphasised the incapacity of the government.</li> <li>• The work and propaganda of Mussolini.</li> <li>• A proportional representation system which reflected (but current opinion seems to think it did not cause) political instability.</li> </ul>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
3	<p><b>To what extent did collectivisation improve Russian agriculture?</b></p> <p>There is a case to be argued each way, partly depending on how the word 'improve' is interpreted, and partly depending on whether potential as opposed to actual improvement is considered.</p> <p>The case for improvement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It gave the state ownership of agriculture, so agriculture and food production could be more effectively managed in the interests of the state and the Russian people.</li> <li>• In theory, the ending of the profit and subsistence motivations should have benefitted agriculture.</li> <li>• By 1931/2 virtually all the land utilised for cereal crops was collectivised and could now be used less wastefully.</li> <li>• Mechanisation was now possible – which elsewhere had led to increased productivity.</li> <li>• There was scope now for much better education in agricultural methods and techniques. Scientific methods could now be utilised.</li> <li>• The serious underemployment and unemployment in rural areas was ended and there was now much more labour available for industrial production.</li> <li>• There was now a surplus of wheat etc. for export, which enabled the purchase of foreign engineering.</li> <li>• State grain collection rose from 10.8 metric tonnes in 1928-29 to 22.8 metric tonnes in 1931-32. Figures now reckoned to be reasonably accurate.</li> </ul> <p>The case against improvement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The loss of millions of agricultural workers and their experience.</li> <li>• The loss of a substantial amount of skills.</li> <li>• The loss of huge amounts of livestock.</li> <li>• The private plots produced as much in some regions as their local collectives.</li> <li>• The only reason why productivity did not decline even more comprehensively in the longer term was because of the good harvests of 1928-30 as a result of very good weather conditions.</li> <li>• The mechanisation programme was a disaster for years as few knew how to use tractors effectively and there was often a critical shortage of fuel and spares.</li> <li>• A huge amount of money and manpower had to be used to police collectivisation.</li> <li>• The vast majority of those who ran collectivisation in the localities as well as those involved in the central planning lacked relevant knowledge and experience and caused chaos. Political and ideological considerations now dominated to the detriment of agricultural considerations.</li> <li>• Incompetent use of the wrong type of fertiliser and pesticides could now happen on a wide scale.</li> </ul>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
4	<p><b>How far was the failure of Weimar’s political leadership to solve Germany’s problems responsible for the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor?</b></p> <p>The leadership, ranging from Hindenburg to men like Papen, Brüning and Schleicher, must take some of the blame, but a variety of other factors need to be taken into consideration as well.</p> <p>The case for the failure by the leadership:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Their management of the implications of the Crash and Depression.</li> <li>• Schacht did produce a plan, similar to the one – and arguably better – than he produced for the Nazis in 1933, which could have led to a serious improvement in the unimplemented situation. However, there was a real lack of will to actually implement it.</li> <li>• The political manoeuvrings of men like Papen who were more concerned with power than dealing with the economic crisis.</li> <li>• There was a failure by the Right and the Centre to work together, and much the same could be said for the Centre and the Left.</li> <li>• There was a belief that Hitler could be managed, and that the Nazis’ electoral success was unlikely to last. While it did, it could be manipulated to their own ends by the Nationalists, for example.</li> <li>• The ageing Hindenburg was simply unable to cope – or be aware of the situation and the potential of the Nazi menace.</li> </ul> <p>The case for other factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Weimar politicians did not cause the Crash and mass unemployment.</li> <li>• Germany had been hit exceptionally hard by the US led tariff war and its recall of loans.</li> <li>• Hitler had a huge range of skills which he used effectively as well as his ability to give the impression that he was working always within the law.</li> <li>• The brilliant propaganda campaign of the Nazis and the work of men like Goebbels and Hugenberg.</li> <li>• The memories of Versailles and the hyperinflation of the 1920s.</li> <li>• There were always reservations about the actual legitimacy of the Weimar regime.</li> <li>• The electoral system of PR reflected, but did not cause, the instability of the period.</li> <li>• Many of the elites, such as the army, the owners of many heavy industries and press barons such as Hugenberg, not only gave little support to Weimar, but in some cases actively undermined it.</li> </ul>	30



Question	Answer	Marks
5	<p><b>'Private companies were responsible for the economic prosperity of the United States in the 1950s.' How far do you agree?</b></p> <p>Possible discussion points that support the view that private companies were responsible for economic prosperity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There was a general shift from wartime focus on armaments to consumer production – Nixon's boast that there were '60 million cars in America'.</li> <li>• New industries – plastics, TV, jet engines, mass housing – created jobs and stimulated demand from post-war consumers.</li> <li>• Growth of companies that fed consumerism – Holiday Inn, Pizza Hut.</li> <li>• There was an increase in conglomerates and franchises.</li> <li>• Private sector innovation and investment helped to drive many new industries: plastics, TV, jet engines, mass housing. This created jobs and stimulated demand from post-war consumers.</li> <li>• Growth of consumer credit which echoed the 1920s saw the economy grow.</li> </ul> <p>Possible discussion points that support the role of increased federal expenditure in the growth of economic prosperity includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Real terms defence spending in 1960 was almost three times what it had been in 1950. This led to an increased federal budget and jobs to service the new industries.</li> <li>• There was increased social spending during the 1950s e.g. through the extension of the 1944 G.I. Bill in 1952 and other educational spending.</li> <li>• Full employment in the United States enabled people to spend more on consumer goods which drove those industries e.g. televisions.</li> <li>• The federal government also managed to follow sympathetic trade policies during this period. Talks at GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade led to tariff reductions from 1955-59.</li> <li>• Cheap oil from domestic sources was a major boost to the economy.</li> </ul>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
6	<p><b>To what extent did Ford and Carter face similar domestic problems during their presidencies?</b></p> <p>Candidates may wish to focus on the similar structural problems both faced with the post-Watergate presidency leading to a more assertive congress; the rancour created by fallout from the Vietnam War and the economic problems created by the two oil shocks and stagflation. Both had different relationships with the public reflecting their images: Ford being the ‘insider’ and Carter the ‘outsider’ which also shaped the different ways they ran their administrations domestically.</p> <p>Problems faced by Ford:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ford was seen by many as being a typical corrupt politician.</li> <li>• His policy of a part amnesty for Vietnam draft dodgers pleased neither liberals nor conservatives.</li> <li>• When Ford testified to Congress after his pardon of Nixon, commentators sensed a power shift from the White House to Congress. The Washington Reporter called it a ‘power earthquake’.</li> <li>• He failed to work with Congress and vetoed 66 bills in 29 months.</li> <li>• In <i>A Ford Not a Lincoln</i> (1975) Richard Reeves depicted him as a vain, ignorant and vacuous man who lacked principles or goals. He certainly lacked the ability to inspire.</li> </ul> <p>Problems faced by Carter:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Carter’s victory was lacklustre and he did not have a strong popular mandate.</li> <li>• He inherited the problems of a country divided by Vietnam and Watergate, as well as a liberal ideology which was increasingly discredited. He had also criticised the Washington establishment during his campaign.</li> <li>• His staff (known as the ‘Georgia Mafia’ or the ‘Peanut Brigade’) were inexperienced, insular, uncoordinated and error prone.</li> <li>• He suffered from a lack of vision – his biographer Burton Kaufman said ‘he was a President who never adequately defined a mission for his government, a purpose for his country, and a way to get there.’</li> <li>• He failed to work with Congress – the House speaker Tip O’Neill felt Carter ‘didn’t seem to understand’ the need to master the legislative process.</li> </ul>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
7	<p><b>‘The activities of the religious right made a fundamental difference to the politics of the 1980s.’ How far do you agree?</b></p> <p>Candidates are required to identify the novel features of 1980s politics which can be attributed to the religious right and how that could be distinguished from the traditional influence of religion on US politics. Candidates can also point out that the religious right’s influence has been exaggerated.</p> <p>Possible areas of discussion on the impact of the religious right:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority was founded in 1979 to make sure that evangelical Christians voted for its preferred presidential candidates who were always Republican. This can be seen as a change from earlier leaders such as Billy Graham and Pat Robertson who backed Democratic candidates and the Baptist tradition of separating religion and politics. The ‘religious right’ of the 1980s can be seen as ‘putting their eggs completely in the GOP basket’.</li> <li>• Moral Majority were said to have played an important role in getting Reagan elected in 1980 and 1984. They were especially influential in Southern states. Local chapters also campaigned to oust liberal members of Congress in the 1980 election.</li> <li>• With four million members and two million donors at its peak, the Moral Majority was one of the largest conservative lobby groups in the United States.</li> <li>• The Religious Right had an impact on public opinion in this period as people began to question the ‘liberal’ reforms of the 1970s e.g. the availability of abortion, liberal attitudes to drugs, the place of religion in education and society, and the treatment of minorities such as homosexuals in society. Falwell said, “God is angry with us as a nation,” and declared, “I have a divine mandate to go right into the halls of Congress and fight for laws that will save America.”</li> </ul> <p>Possible areas of discussion on the limited impact of the religious right could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• While there is some evidence that the Moral Majority made a difference in the 1980 election, Falwell’s talent for publicity has led some to suggest that the influence of the religious right has been exaggerated. There is some evidence more people voted for Walter Mondale in 1984 through hostility to the religious right than voted for Reagan because of the religious right’s support for his candidacy.</li> <li>• By the mid-1980s the religious right was already declining in power through increased financial problems, scandals affecting leading evangelists, and divisions between Falwell and Pat Robertson over the 1988 Republican presidential nomination.</li> <li>• Although politicians continued to extract time and money from evangelicals there was little success in the form of legislation that explicitly followed the demands of the religious right.</li> <li>• While conservative judges were appointed to the Supreme Court, with some notoriety over the attempt to appoint Robert Bork who was criticised by Ted Kennedy, the judiciary retained the landmark social legislation that had been passed over the previous three decades e.g. there was no repeal of Roe vs Wade.</li> </ul>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
8	<p><b>Assess the importance of the Middle East to US foreign policy during the 1950s.</b></p> <p>Candidates can analyse the different ways in which the Middle East was important to US foreign policy and can compare this to other areas which could be argued to be more important. A balanced response is required that gives the Middle East sufficient attention.</p> <p>Evidence that the Middle East was important to US foreign policy in the 1950s could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Middle East was a desirable area to build allegiances for both sides in the Cold War due not only to its vast oil reserves but to the Suez Canal which was a strategic link between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. From 1951 the US tried to organise an anti-Soviet alliance in the Middle East.</li> <li>• In 1953, Eisenhower successfully intervened in support of the Shah of Iran enabling him to defeat his pro-Soviet rival. However, this remained a ‘special ops’ intervention largely in support of British interests in Iran. The United States was happy to remain in the background at this point.</li> <li>• Eisenhower refused to support the British during the Suez Crisis. He feared that countries in the Middle East would see it as American support for imperialism and be pushed further into the arms of the Communists. He was also angry with the British government for not consulting him over the Suez action.</li> <li>• From the beginning of 1957, there was increased US involvement in the Middle East which became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Eisenhower asked Congress for aid to support countries in the Middle East who were threatened with aggression. Suez had persuaded Eisenhower that he could no longer take a back seat to British interests in the Middle East. By the end of the 1950’s, the Eisenhower administration sought to accommodate Arab-nationalism in recognition of the importance of the region to the US.</li> </ul> <p>Evidence that the Middle East was less important to US foreign policy in the 1950s could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• US policy in the 1950s was dominated by events in Asia where the fall of China to communism caused major concern: the Korean War and the two Taiwan crises were both major priorities for Truman and Eisenhower</li> <li>• US foreign policy tended to follow Britain and recognised its strong presence in the Middle East. At the beginning of the decade the US mostly acted in support of this. In January 1952, the US and Britain announced a joint statement on the Middle East – ‘We have found a complete identity of aims between us in this part of the world.’</li> <li>• Europe remained a major area of US foreign policy concern. The tensions with Stalin in the early 1950s, the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the response to Khrushchev’s calls for “Peaceful Co-existence,” the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 and the Second Berlin crisis from 1958 all go to show this.</li> </ul>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="371 253 1305 421">• The Arms Race with the USSR was a major concern in the USA. There were concerns that the USSR was pulling ahead of the USA and had developed ‘bomber’ and ‘missile’ gaps. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the failure of the US Vanguard programme added to US fears of Soviet superiority.</li></ul>	

Question	Answer	Marks
9	<p><b>'In the period 1950 to 1963 the Soviet Union was more successful in spreading communism than the USA was in containing it.' How far do you agree?</b></p> <p>This question requires candidates to evaluate the hypothesis which can be argued in different ways: both sides can claim to have been more successful or it could be argued that both cancelled the other out. Better responses may note that the superpowers were by no means in complete control of global events and often they were reacting. The key point is that candidates argue a reasoned case.</p> <p>Evidence that the Soviet Union was more successful in spreading communism than the USA was in containing it could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty 1950 saw close ties being formed between the USSR and the newly founded People's Republic of China. This helped support the notion that communism was becoming a dominant force in the world.</li> <li>• The Korean War showed that communism was spreading and Americans had a growing enemy with North Korea becoming an aggressive communist country</li> <li>• The Hungarian Uprising of 1956 was suppressed with little US response which showed USSR's firm grip over Eastern Europe. The powerlessness of the USA was also demonstrated by the failure to prevent the Berlin Wall being constructed in 1961.</li> <li>• Cuba: Eisenhower's embargo policy after the fall of Batista in 1959 helped consolidate links between Castro and the USSR. The Bay of Pigs fiasco failed to limit communism in Cuba and encouraged closer links, which culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962; US was forced to remove missiles from Turkey after CMC as part of the secret deal with USSR.</li> <li>• It could be argued that the US attempts to prevent French loss of Indochina to the communist Vietminh was unsuccessful. With the USSR's support the establishment of North Vietnam after the Geneva agreement of 1954 and the increasing communist influence in South Vietnam by 1963 was evidence for Soviet success and US failure.</li> </ul> <p>Evidence that the Soviet Union was less successful in spreading communism than the USA was in containing it could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• JFK's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis was seen as a victory for the USA. Cuba was prevented from obtaining nuclear weapons and the USSR was forced to back down.</li> <li>• Korean War – the USA prevented the fall of South Korea and the subsequent feared 'domino theory' of East Asia; the support of the UN was a valuable boost to the USA's claim that it was defending the free world against aggression.</li> <li>• Events in Eastern Europe (Hungary and Berlin Wall) can as easily be argued to have been own-goals by the USSR showing that they could only impose communism by force.</li> </ul>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="363 248 1316 416">• The USA prevented any spread of Communist influence in both Latin America (apart from Cuba) with CIA organised coups against suspect democratic regimes in Guatemala. Similarly CIA sponsored coups in Syria and Iran limited the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East.</li></ul>	

Question	Answer	Marks
10	<p data-bbox="316 248 1284 315"><b>‘The Cold War ended as a result of the Second Cold War.’ How far do you agree?</b></p> <p data-bbox="316 349 1299 647">This question requires the candidate to look at the toughening approach of the USA in the early 1980s under Reagan and the hawkish rhetoric and the increased defence spending and the impact of all these upon the USSR at the time but also the impact on the next Soviet Leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. Candidates need to balance this with the détente after 1985, the changing policies of the USSR and the more amenable policies followed by the West towards the USSR. In essence was it the USA’s strength and increased belligerence that made the USSR seek a peaceful solution to end the Cold War?</p> <p data-bbox="316 685 1291 748">Evidence that could be used to argue that the Second Cold War ended the Cold War includes:</p> <ul data-bbox="363 786 1315 1599" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="363 786 1315 1021">• The sharp rise in tensions 1979-85 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saw the failure of the US Congress to ratify SALT II and increased US research and expenditure on weapons such as the B1 bomber, the SDI programme &amp; Pershing II MRBM. This then put increased pressure on the USSR’s weaker financial and economic position, which was struggling to keep up with the USA’s economic power.</li> <li data-bbox="363 1025 1315 1227">• The USA under Reagan was committed to ‘roll back’ communism. This caused the escalation of conflicts in Central America and increased support for the Mujahidin in the Soviet-Afghan War. These actions were designed to weaken the USSR and arguably forced Gorbachev to change to a more realistic policy after 1985 and bring the Cold War to an end.</li> <li data-bbox="363 1232 1315 1429">• Increased US aggression deeply alarmed the USSR: the angry Soviet reaction to North Pacific exercises in 1983 led to the shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight 007; NATO exercise Able Archer 83 convinced the USSR that a nuclear attack was imminent – both episodes exposed inefficiencies in the Soviet military system and led a loss of confidence in the USSR’s élites.</li> <li data-bbox="363 1433 1315 1599">• Reagan’s “Evil Empire” rhetoric and aggressive policies led to increased concern about Western economic sanctions. This led the USSR to hesitate and then not intervene in Poland during the Solidarity crisis of 1980-81. These events expose the USSR’s lack of will to maintain its grip over Eastern Europe by force.</li> </ul> <p data-bbox="316 1637 1307 1700">Evidence that could be used to argue that other factors ended the Cold War includes:</p> <ul data-bbox="363 1738 1307 1904" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="363 1738 1307 1904">• The Second Cold War coincided with short-lived Soviet geriatric leaders – Brezhnev’s death, Andropov, Chernenko – and there were no meaningful changes made to policy in the face of US pressure. Much of the USSR’s weak response was due to internal political stasis, not US pressure.</li> </ul>	30



Question	Answer	Marks
10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Gorbachev's leadership after 1985 onwards was also significant – his policies (perestroika, glasnost, end of Brezhnev Doctrine) were the culmination of a long-term realisation within reformist circles that the USSR needed to reform its economy. Living standards were falling and the USSR could no longer match the west. Arms expenditure and subsidies for the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe and other communist countries were simply too expensive. This arguably would have happened anyway, without the Second Cold War.</li><li>• The softening of Reagan's hard-line approach after 1985 - summit diplomacy and the establishment of a good working relationship with Gorbachev were arguably more important in bringing an end to the Cold War than the aggression of 1979–85.</li></ul>	

Question	Answer	Marks
11	<p><b>Assess the extent to which Mao Zedong was responsible for the Sino-Soviet split.</b></p> <p>This question focuses on how far Mao’s long-term suspicion of Moscow, his personal distrust of Khrushchev and paranoia of a Soviet conspiracy against him drove the split with the USSR and how far this was to do with broader cultural and ideological tensions between China and Russia. Great power rivalry was another factor that could be taken into consideration.</p> <p>Evidence to support the argument that Mao was personally responsible for the Sino-Soviet split includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mao was prepared to openly criticise Soviet policy and was suspicious of the Soviet Union’s motives towards China. He was seeking world revolution and he criticised the Soviet Union for pursuing peaceful co-existence with the West. Mao thought that Stalin wanted a weak China that he could dominate.</li> <li>• Mao felt that the Soviet Union was following a policy of détente with the West to leave China isolated. In 1957 Mao attended a conference in Moscow of the world’s communist parties. He insisted that the Soviet Union should abandon revisionism. Mao also ridiculed Khrushchev for withdrawing from the Cuban Crisis. The signing of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963 between the Soviet Union and western nuclear powers was viewed by Mao as another move by the Soviet Union to abandon its nuclear role and cooperate with imperialism.</li> <li>• Mao’s treatment of the Soviet leader was very provocative. Khrushchev’s visit to China in 1958 resulted in humiliating treatment. Mao also gave aid to Albania after the Soviet Union had withdrawn aid in 1961.</li> <li>• The onset of Mao’s Cultural Revolution severed all contact between the two countries.</li> </ul> <p>Evidence to support the argument that other factors were responsible for the Sino-Soviet split includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech’ attacked Stalin for his ‘crimes against the party’ accusing him of being engaged in a ‘cult of personality’. Khrushchev failed to appreciate how this would upset China. Mao believed this was a criticism of his own style of leadership. He also believed de-Stalinisation for the 1956 protests in Eastern Europe and did not want China to face dissent.</li> <li>• Khrushchev accused Mao and his supporters of being Trotskyists. Khrushchev’s reference to the Albanian leader’s backward Stalinist ways was regarded as an attack on China. Khrushchev referred to Mao as an ‘Asian Hitler.’</li> <li>• The Soviet Union withdrew economic advisers from China and cancelled commercial contracts. Moscow was also highly critical of the Great Leap Forward. Thus, the Soviet Union made the first move in severing ties with China.</li> </ul>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• During the Sino-Indian War in 1962 the Soviet Union provided India with MiG fighters even though it remained neutral.</li><li>• The Soviet Union refused to help China create nuclear weapons without having some control over China's defence policy.</li></ul>	

Question	Answer	Marks
12	<p><b>How far was Saddam Hussein responsible for the Iran - Iraq War (1980 - 88)?</b></p> <p>This question invites candidates to relatively evaluate the importance of Saddam's opportunism in attacking Iran after the chaos of the Islamic Revolution with longer-term tensions between Iraq &amp; Iran and the fears created in Iraq that Khomeini would export his brand of Shiite militancy to the Shia majority in Iraq. It is possible to argue both sides, but the better responses will sharply focus on Saddam's personal culpability and ambitions.</p> <p>Evidence to support the argument that Saddam Hussein was responsible for the Iran-Iraq War could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Saddam began the war in September 1980 hoping that his pre-emptive strike would result in the overthrow of the Khomeini regime before it could overthrow him. There was deep enmity between Khomeini and Saddam, and the latter felt peaceful co-existence was impossible.</li> <li>• Saddam believed that the fall of the Shah had left the country in chaos and that the western boycott of trade with Iran would further weaken its economy. He envisaged an easy victory over demoralised Iranian troops. His aim was to secure his own position as Iraq's leader and ensure that his country would be recognised as the leading power in the Gulf.</li> <li>• Saddam aimed to gain control of the Shatt-al-Arab waterway which bordered Iran to gain a secure outlet to the sea. This had been a major source of disagreement between Iraq and Iran since 1936. Iran had forced Iraq to make concessions of territory after skirmishes in 1975 leading to the Algiers agreement of 1975, which Iraq aimed to reverse.</li> <li>• Saddam underestimated the power of Iranian revolutionary zeal. This made it easy for Iran to recruit soldiers who were prepared for martyrdom. He also under-estimated Iran's determination to continue with the war.</li> </ul> <p>Evidence to support the argument that other factors were responsible for the Iran-Iraq War could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ayatollah Khomeini regarded Iraq as a prime target for spreading the Islamic Revolution. Iraq had a secular Sunni-led government and Khomeini hoped that Iraq's large Shiite population would topple it.</li> <li>• Iran's intransigence led to the prolonged war; Khomeini despised Iraq's Ba'ath government. By 1982 the Iranian troops had driven back the Iraqis to the border. Saddam was willing to negotiate a cease-fire, but Iran's aim made this impossible and the situation became worse when Iran confirmed that its target was Baghdad.</li> </ul>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Foreign involvement also helped to encourage Saddam and prolonged the war. Most of the Arab states supported Iraq's Sunni regime with money and arms. Syria supported Iran; they shut their Iraqi pipelines in return for free Iranian oil. The USA, France, Germany and the Soviet Union supported Iraq. The main suppliers of arms to Iraq were France and the Soviet Union. The USA was afraid of the oil in the Gulf falling into the hands of Iran who would be able to control world oil prices.</li></ul>	